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News [Jun. 6th, 2011|01:02 am]
puffinn
 I just had the first public showing of my Short film "Symmetry". It was a big success. 

It was nominated best Actor, best director, best cinematography and audience choice. It took home cinematography. 

I have some more work to do but it was invited to submit to the Sedona International Film Festival. If it gets in that would be a very cool thing because it is a very large festival and very well attended. 

I just have to figure out how to make the improvements I need to without access to the schools equipment please pray that these provisions will come through. 

I'm very proud of my first short. 
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A nother movie [Jul. 1st, 2008|03:19 pm]
puffinn

I have another lead in a short film. I really like the script for this project.

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An interesting take on this subject. [Jun. 24th, 2008|10:41 am]
puffinn

Baby Bust!

The world is panicking over birthrates. Again.

Kerry Howley | July 2008 Print Edition

The question isn’t about whether the United States, Singapore, or France will be without people in 2100; it’s about what kind of people will populate those countries: what they will look like, what they will teach in their schools, what God they will bow before

Are lad mags and the Nintendo corporation responsible for a global decline in birthrates? Broadly, nations that are more developed (and therefore more likely to produce video games and men’s magazines) produce fewer children than less developed nations. But while Demographic Winter uses Europe as the ultimate cautionary tale, Europe’s current demographics largely contradict the idea that more socially conservative societies tend to produce more children.

Religion? It is the most religious European countries, such as Italy, that have the continent’s lowest fertility rates; secular Norway is just under replacement level. Working women? European countries with the highest work force participation rates, such as Sweden and Norway, tend to have higher fertility than those with a comparatively small percentage of women working, such as Greece.

Cohabitation? France, where shacking up is a social norm, has a higher fertility rate than any of its immediate neighbors. Family instability? In a forthcoming book, Demographic Challenges for the 21st Century, the demographer Tomas Sobotka argues that divorce rates in Europe might be positively correlated with birthrates. “Many countries which have advanced furthest in the decline of traditional family and the spread of less conventional and less stable living arrangements,” he writes, “record relatively high fertility when judged by contemporary European standards.” Low levels of economic development coupled with social conservatism may well produce high fertility levels; but in modern Europe, it seems that the combination of a modern economy and social conservatism may produce some of the lowest fertility levels on Earth.

In the first half of the 20th century, demographers generally held that urbanization, industrialization, and education were the chief determinants of fertility decline. Later, neoclassical economists hypothesized that the rate of decline would correlate with the rates of increase in the opportunity cost of women staying out of the work force and in the relative cost of raising children.

The latter theory is useful “as a way to structure thinking,” according to the American Enterprise Institute demographer Nicholas Eberstadt, but, as with nearly every theory of fertility, there is much that it fails to explain. The relative cost of having children is indeed very high in Hong Kong, Japan, and the United States, but these countries have markedly different birth rates. Nor does it explain why the birthrate is lower north of the Canadian border than south of it.

Strangest of all, total fertility rates are dropping most rapidly in predominantly rural countries with low female literacy rates and few work force opportunities. Dramatic drops in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, absent much economic development, have come as a surprise to economists and demographers alike. In 1970, according to the United Nation’s Children’s Fund, Bangladesh’s total fertility rate was 6.4. In 2006 it was 2.9. Zimbabwe’s rate dropped from 7.4 to 3.3 during the same period.

The theory that economic development leads to fertility decline breaks down at the very first demographic data point on record. The first country to enter a sustained fertility decline was not England, the cradle of the industrial revolution. “It was France!” exclaims Eberstadt. “France was rural and poor and was very largely illiterate and, not to put to fine a point on it, it was Catholic. That kind of confutes a lot of things we think are supposed to connect between modernization and fertility change.”

“Evidence reveals that, in most countries, most young people aspire to an enduring intimate relationship and to having children,” wrote Peter McDonald in an influential 2005 paper on fertility policy. “However, faced with the realities of the new social and economic world, many do not achieve these aspirations.” McDonald blames deregulation and “neoliberalism” for an environment hostile to procreation. “States,” he concludes tidily, “must be principal players in restoring the social balance.”

The contention that women aren’t having as many children as they’d like to is rooted in “desired fertility,” or the number of children women say they want as they enter their childbearing years. In Europe, as women increasingly choose to go childless, they continue to tell surveyors that they want two children. That disparity is sometimes deemed “unmet demand”; governments, goes the theory, must assist women in the quest to produce the children they say they want.

When the concept is framed this way, most of us have “unmet demand” for any number of goods—flat-screen televisions, yachts, MacBooks—that taxpayers fail to help us acquire. No one doubts that it is possible to structure incentives such that more women will use their bodies in the way politicians prefer, which is why many liberal arguments for pro-fertility policies are suspiciously self-affirming. Offered millions of dollars per birth, women would indeed go into labor more often. Pregnant women can then be cast as responding rationally to incentives or as “achieving their aspirations” to become a mother. The more relevant question, and the one rarely broached, is whether women who choose not to have children should be forced to subsidize those who do.

There is an alternative explanation for the behavior of young women who declare a desire for two children yet go on to have one or none: Women may be telling pollsters what they think the pollsters want to hear, or simply reciting lines memorized from cultural scripts. “The answers may reflect mere stereotypes,” wrote the demographers Gustavo De Santis and Massimo Livi Bacci in a 2001 study, “and not constitute any reliable guide of people’s true preferences or intentions for the future.” The two-child norm, they add, “generally prevails in our times.” Men and women may continue to idealize the nuclear family—one boy, one girl—well beyond its heyday.

At the moment, small cash handouts do not appear to be doing much to increase birthrates across Europe and Asia. More-sophisticated attempts to reduce the burdens of working mothers, such as subsidized day care or regulations regarding the status of part-time workers, may raise birthrates very slightly, but there is no consensus on whether they are effective. Birthrates rise and fall, and it’s difficult to establish causality even when fertility rates shoot up after a policy goes into effect.

Michael Teitelbaum, a historian of demography, says he knows of only two places where pro-natalist policies have achieved real long-term results. One was communist East Germany, where wages were kept so low that the government could afford to pay baby bonuses that amounted to one-third of what a woman would have made working that year. The other was communist Romania, where dictator Nicolae Ceausescu outlawed contraception and abortion in October 1966 without warning. The resulting spike in birth rates was the largest in recorded history. That worked for about a decade, says Teitelbaum, “until people reconstructed their illegal ways of controlling their fertility.”

Birthrate Pangs
Depopulation panic isn’t new. It’s merely making a comeback after a long, anomalous period of overpopulation panic. Waves of birthrate anxiety swept through France at the beginning of the 19th century and the United States between the world wars. Today’s developed-world worries are in one sense very understandable: No one alive today can remember a time when the global population was not on the rise. Growth has become the norm, and that norm may change in the foreseeable future. “When [growth] goes negative even a tiny amount,” says Teitelbaum, “some people immediately say, well, this is a quantum, dramatic shift in what it means to be a human society.”

Quantum or otherwise, a demographic shift does require adjustment, notably of pension programs that are built on faulty assumptions of endless expansion. Fertility declines alter the basic age structure of a society, much as the baby boom did a half-century ago. Neither gradual declines nor gradual increases in population need be destructive, but the former will require concrete changes in redistribution schemes and a reshuffling of resources.

For those who, with good reason, worry about the solvency of transfer programs in an age of population decline, replacement immigration looks like a partial solution, and therefore xenophobia is part of the problem. But for many if not most of the people preoccupied by fertility rates, immigration is no solution at all. The question isn’t about whether the United States, Singapore, or France will be without people in 2100; it’s about what kind of people will populate those countries: what they will look like, what they will teach in their schools, what God they will bow before. Mark Steyn’s America Alone warns that within a few generations Europe will be a Muslim continent. When Pat Buchanan discusses depopulation in The Death of the West, he does not proceed to suggest we replace children of European descent with Mexican laborers. Pro-natalist policies in Quebec, Singapore, and until recently Israel implicitly target a preferred ethnic group, attempting to fill the future with the demographics desired by the current political class.

Michael Teitelbaum and Jay Winter have another explanation for the current fertility panic. “Such worries seem to crop up at predictable moments,” they wrote in a response to Phillip Longman in the September 2004 Foreign Affairs, arguing that “when a dominant political or economic power begins to feel unsure of its mastery and uncertain about the future, many thinkers turn to demography for an explanation of its plight.”

In times of collective insecurity, empty wombs are cast as either a cause or a symptom of a state supposedly in decline. In their 1985 book The Fear of Population Decline, Teitelbaum and Winter say pro-natalism became a French obsession after Germany invaded France in the late 19th century. Emile Zola’s 1899 novel Fecondite is a 19th-century version of Demographic Winter, no less subtle in its message or gentle in its warning. Zola tells the story of a factory worker named Mathieu Froment and his wife, Marianne, who reproduce at a rate that alarms their individualistic, selfish, and more prosperous neighbors. A bourgeois accountant at the factory equates fertility with poverty. Naturally, his wife dies during a botched abortion. Mathieu’s employer mocks the highly fertile, avoids reproduction, and espouses neo-Malthusianism; his single son becomes a murderer and his wife goes mad and dies. The Angelins, a pair of individualists, decide to put off parenthood; Mme. Angelin dies childless, penniless, and thoroughly disgraced. Through it all, the noble Froments continue to multiply. “At one point,” Teitelbaum and Winter note, “Marianne delivers at the rate of one child every two pages.”

Fear of invasion is a theme running straight through the historical narrative of fertility alarmism. It’s no coincidence that the first great wave of American immigration coincided with a period of heightened maternalist rhetoric. President Theodore Roosevelt was particularly concerned about the “race suicide” of white Protestants. “The severest of all condemnations should be that visited upon willful sterility,” he said in 1910, shortly after his second term had ended. “The first essential in any civilization is that the man and woman shall be father and mother of healthy children, so that the race shall increase and not decrease.”

Periods of anxiety over “race suicide” are rarely good times for women. Protestants who were worried about the rising tide of foreign Catholics passed anti-abortion laws in the 1880s that endured until 1973, when Roe v. Wade limited their scope. Embracing historical continuity with the nativists who came before him, Mark Steyn takes time in America Alone to blame women for aborting the generation that might have stood between us and the coming Islamification of the West. It’s not surprising at all that the single greatest social anxiety of our time has been reduced to crude demographic projections that pin the blame on empty wombs.

Slippery Science
In 1960 Princeton demographers sought to buttress current population theory in one of the most ambitious demographic projects ever. The European Fertility Project, led by Ansley Coale, collected massive amounts of data from city registers and church basements and mapped fertility rates in 600 European provinces.

The problem: No extant theory would hold the disparate results together. “They ran into a lot of brick walls,” says Eberstadt. “This pattern of diffusion of fertility decline didn’t make a lot of sense to labor force specialists or to industrialization specialists. Then some specialist said, ‘Oh! I see what you have there; you have a map of the language families of modern Europe.’” People who spoke the same language, the researchers found, tended to enter fertility decline at around the same time. Women were having fewer children because their friends were having fewer children. It’s a completely fascinating and utterly question-begging conclusion. What domino sets off the cascade of childlessness?

“The problem,” the historian Charles Tilly writes in the introduction to Historical Studies of Changing Fertility, “is that we have too many explanations which are individually plausible in general terms, which contradict each other to some degree, and which fail to fit some significant part of the facts.”

The result is a plethora of explanatory narratives, some with more predictive power than others but none totally satisfying. What’s more, the “ideal fertility rate” itself is a matter of ideological preference. “It’s not obvious to me what the ‘right’ level for birthrates is for any country,” says Eberstadt. “It is obvious to me what the right direction for mortality is. The right direction is down. But fertility is a much more complicated story.” There isn’t even a consensus about the relationship between population growth and economic growth. Theoretically, individual incomes can continue to rise as the population falls.

The answer is likely to be a complex combination of theories we already have—sociological, anthropological, and economic. In the midst of so many plausible causes, it’s tempting to search for a narrative that conforms to previously held convictions or confirms long-held anxieties. The search for a valueless science of demography continues to be conducted in vain, and the very language we use to discuss falling birthrates is loaded with unscientific judgment. Nations are not just depopulating; they are “dying,” “decaying,” even “autogenocidal.” Fertility rates don’t just decline; they “collapse.” Our future is “barren,” a “demographic winter” marked by “sterility” and “senescence.”

Bogus fears about fertility decline don’t preclude justified ones, and current rates of fertility pose real, though not obviously catastrophic, challenges. In a shrinking society that refuses to welcome more immigrants or reform population-dependent social programs, something will have to give. Cash handouts for kids are a far cry from the more coercive pro-natalist policies of Ceausescu and Mussolini, and pro-fertility policies will cease to provoke charges of totalitarianism when they are wrapped into larger social welfare policies. Many changes sold as supportive of working women, such as extending the public school day to conform with work hours, are often defended on their own merits as well.

But as pro-baby policies are inevitably sold as pro-mother, and by extension pro-woman, it’s worth recalling the sentiment behind the Australian birth premiums and Singaporean matchmaking schemes. At the heart of any fertility incentive lies an attempt to encourage a particular group of women to orient their bodies in a traditional way. Every pro-fertility policy is an effort to slow cultural transformation, to stabilize a society’s ethnic composition, to ossify a current conception of a national culture by freezing the genetic makeup of a nation. From Poland to Singapore, swollen wombs are a bulwark against change.

There is a reason we speak of “Mother Russia” and “Mother India.” Feminist sociologists such as Nira Yuval-Davis refer to women as the “boundary markers” of a state or society. While men may leave, fight, and be compromised, women represent purity and continuity. Yuval-Davis points out in her book Gender and Nation that the Hitler Youth Movement had different mottos for girls and boys. The boys’ motto was: “Live faithfully; fight bravely; die laughing.” For girls: “Be faithful; be pure; be German.” Girls simply had to be. They were the collective.

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Check it out [Jan. 18th, 2008|12:44 pm]
puffinn

I have posted Stills fromt he movie I was in on myspace. Check them out if you like.

http://www.myspace.com/JEREMYR_NARANJO

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A Good week [Dec. 23rd, 2007|01:54 am]
puffinn
[mood |jubilantjubilant]

If my luck goes like this next week my business plan will get funded.

First I made a single $80 tip on Thursday night. Good for Durant Oklahoma and only 9 people. I cleared over $100 in a single shift not bad for Durant. Not great for many other places but Durant good. 

Tonight a cut girl said she likes me. 

Then I went to the casino to see a Comedian that my employer recomended and I was going to leave after that when my boss sat down to play some slots and said I should stay to. I had already lost a few dollars waiting for the comedy show to start but the show was free so I figured no big deal. I wasn't playing I was just keeping my boss company cause he's a cool guy best boss I've ever had and you'll see more evidence of this in a minute. 

He gives me a twenty and says play this one for me since you don't play you will have good luck. Whatever I played and played and got up to about 70 or so then back down to 20 even I chashed out intending to give him back his even money. But then I went back the the machines I had been playing and having good luck on and next thing I know I'm up $520. I cash out and my Boss (Gzim Versnichi) says give me the twenty back and half. I thought that is more than fair. Then as I'm giving it to him he says nahh just 100 you keep the rest. 

OK! I won't argue. Then ten minutes later he gives me back the 100 so I wone 500 dollars gambling with some one elses money. 

I'm hoping this is a sighn of things to come with the business plan I have submitted with Rural Enterprises Incorperated. 
They give me money and I make alot and pay them back really fast. 

Girls and money sweet!

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A respons to some one with no name [Dec. 12th, 2007|02:46 pm]
puffinn
This was what I got as a respons to the post I made about my letter to the Kairose awards.

I am pretty sure the contest rules say that adult themes will be accepted handled with extreme care.

Meanwhile, I suspect the actual shooting script for "The Passion of teh Christ" did not inherently resonate with a R-rating (the document itself wasn't screaming out "I AM AN R!" the way the shooting scripts for "Scarface" and "Pulp Fiction did). However, after they shot it and edited it, they did indeed have an R on their hands.
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Extreme care to not make them more than PG
puffinn
2007-12-12 08:45 pm UTC (from 70.137.31.92) (link) Select
Comment Posted Successfully
The rules did not say this when I read them. They may have changed them. What it said was that a script must be G-PG not even PG13. Secodly you would have to show me the Pre-shooting script for The Passion to prove to me that any one reading it could possable invision a PG scenario of that beating and death. Thirdly I did not mention the passion in my post. I mentioned the crucifiction but not the movie "The Passion of the Christ".

My point was that my Bible is not G-PG. It is full of murder, rape, dismimberment, death, and distruction. My point is that any one seeking to portray these things in a moving and compelling way i.e. real. Cannot possibly do so in a G-PG way. Cant, not and do it justice. I mean can you emagine a PG "Schindler's List?" It would have ben trash and no one would have gotten an Academy. How about a PG "Saving Private Ryan" or "We Were Soldiers"? "Brave Heart"? all movies dealing with true events a PG would have been an afront to every holocost Servivor, Every verteran of Normandy, Every Vietnam Vet. These are th movies that move me as a writter this is the kind of impact I want to have. I can't at PG.

Now if you want to make a family movie about ponies and rainbows and little children sure. But my point is that my Gospel, my life, nothing is PG why should my writting be thus limited.

I was asking if another catigory could be created. To their credit I got two responsis from this e-mail. They said that this has repeatedly come up and that another catigory was in consideration.

P.S. Leave your name so I can know who I'm talking to. and don't come at me with your "suspisions".
(Reply to this)(Parent)

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I like it for whatever it is worth. [Nov. 29th, 2007|03:07 pm]
puffinn
11. AQUARIUS -

(the Water Bearer - 20 January - 18 February)
* Trustworthy.
* Attractive.
* GREAT kisser.
* One of a kind.
* Loves being in long-term relationships.
* Extremely energetic.
* Unpredictable.
* Will exceed your expectations.
* Not a Fighter, but will knock your lights out if it comes down to it.
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My first part in a film is wrapped. [Nov. 7th, 2007|03:43 pm]
puffinn
This weekend was a great learning experience for me. I cannot even express how much I learned. I met alot of really great people and made some great contacts. I met three directors, writters, and working actors. Two with quality representation. If I get some more work behind me and keep studying I'm sure I can ask either one of them to walk me into their agency.

Every one on the shoot got along wonderfully.

The job of actor is definetly the spot to be. Every one else works so hard. The production team is amaizing at all of the details that they track, constantly moving the sets ajusting lighting and the camera. At one point I asked the camera man and his assistant, "so do you guys just hate actors?" One said, "no" the other, "not always." The not always came from the more experienced of the two. I kept trying to help but the 2nd AD told me. "You are talent you don't do anything."

I had heard how much waiting you can do on a movie set as an actor but I had forgotten in all of the excitment of going to my first shoot. I should have brought a book. It is truelly as they say, "hurry up and wait". But I got along well with the crew and cast. Unfortunately they didn't have the film for a blooper real. There was alot of very funny stuff going on.

I think the director was pleased with my work. He had very few directions. The scene I was most nurvouse about was my charactor's death. I just admitted to the Director, "I've never died in a performance before". It wasn't just a death scene but an extreme close up. The camera was inches from my face fake blood oozing out of my mouth and the sound people a foot away with a boom pointed at me. He seemed pleased so I guess I'll see when they finish editing it.

They aren't sure when post production will be done since the editing facilities go to paying work before that of educational work.

The movie was shot on 35mm by a Panivision camera. One of the same cameras used on the set of Dance's with Wolves. I guess the Director knew some one who had 4,000 extra feat of 35mm film left over and they gave it to him. So he collected more a hundred here a hundred there. So if nothing else the movie will suck in letter box clarity.
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Michale Cain Teaches acting for film [Oct. 28th, 2007|03:22 pm]
puffinn
That is the title of the video my acting teacher gave me to watch when I got this part. I think it made things worse in so much as I'm now far more nurvouse than I was.

Michal Cain quotes:

"When you are the lead in a film it is your job to take the whole prject on your shoulders, so much of its success or failure rests on you." "You should know every line every part not just your own to help the other actors."

"Every one on the project is there to make you look good. The electrician will climb in the rafters and hand a light just so that it gets that gleam in your eye. Everything that is done is so that you the actors can make the story come alive. They all know it is hard the camera doesn't lie it catches everything."

I watched this video and admittedly much of it I needed to know but comments like that haunted me as I tried to sleep and I realized I don'tknow what I'm doing. I havn't a clue.

God help me.
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Big News for me [Oct. 25th, 2007|11:13 am]
puffinn
I went to Arlingtong last Friday and auditioned for a student film.

I found out this morning that I GOT THE LEAD. My first audition ever and I got the lead on tape. This is a huge step for me and Idon't have to put student film on my resume just (independent) and I have tape on myself out of the gate many actors struggle to get tape on themselves and a leading credit on their resume...

AHHHH!!! I wish I had some one to hug right now WHEWW!! I am so wired right now.
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